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Abstract
This paper presents a dataset with over 3.3M threads and
134.5M posts from the Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) of
the imageboard forum 4chan, posted over a period of almost
3.5 years (June 2016–November 2019). To the best of our
knowledge, this represents the largest publicly available 4chan
dataset, providing the community with an archive of posts that
have been permanently deleted from 4chan and are otherwise
inaccessible. We augment the data with a set of additional
labels, including toxicity scores and the named entities men-
tioned in each post. We also present a statistical analysis of the
dataset, providing an overview of what researchers interested
in using it can expect, as well as a simple content analysis,
shedding light on the most prominent discussion topics, the
most popular entities mentioned, and the toxicity level of each
post. Overall, we are confident that our work will motivate
and assist researchers in studying and understanding 4chan, as
well as its role on the greater Web. For instance, we hope this
dataset may be used for cross-platform studies of social media,
as well as being useful for other types of research like natural
language processing. Finally, our dataset can assist qualitative
work focusing on in-depth case studies of specific narratives,
events, or social theories.
1 Introduction
Modern society increasingly relies on the Internet for a wide
range of tasks, including gathering, sharing, and commenting
on content, events, and discussions. Alas, the Web has also
enabled anti-social and toxic behavior to occur at an unprece-
dented scale. Malevolent actors routinely exploit social net-
works to target other users via hate speech and abusive behav-
ior, or spread extremist ideologies [3, 12, 13, 40].
A non-negligible portion of these nefarious activities often
originate on “fringe” online platforms, e.g., 4chan, 8chan, Gab.
In fact, research has shown how influential 4chan is in spread-
∗Published at the 14th International AAAI Conference on Web and Social
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ing disinformation [11, 43], hateful memes [42], and coordi-
nating harassment campaigns on other platforms [21, 25, 34].
These platforms are also linked to various real-world violent
events, including the radicalization of users who committed
mass shootings [2, 6, 16].
4chan is an imageboard where users (aka Original Posters,
or OPs) can create a thread by posting an image and a message
to a board; others can post in the OP’s thread, with a message
and/or an image. Among 4chan’s key features are anonymity
and ephemerality; users do not need to register to post content,
and in fact the overwhelming majority of posts are anonymous.
At most, threads are archived after they become inactive and
deleted within 7 days.
Overall, 4chan is widely known for the large amount of con-
tent, memes, slang, and Internet culture it has generated over
the years [15]. For example, 4chan popularized the “lolcat”
meme on the early Web. More recently, politically charged
memes, e.g., “God Emperor Trump” [24] have also originated
on the platform.
Data Release. In this work, we focus on the “Politically In-
correct” board (/pol/),1 given the interest it has generated in
prior research and the influential role it seems to play on the
rest of the Web [7, 21, 43, 34, 42, 39]. Along with the pa-
per, we release a dataset [44] including 134.5M posts from
over 3.3M /pol/ conversation threads, made over a period of
approximately 3.5 years (June 2016–November 2019). Each
post in our dataset has the text provided by the poster, along
with various post metadata (e.g., post id, time, etc.).
We also augment the dataset by attaching additional set of
labels to each post, including: 1) the named entities mentioned
in the post, and 2) the toxicity scores of the post. For the for-
mer, we use the spaCy library [35], and for the latter, Google’s
Perspective API [30].
We also wish to warn the readers that some of the content in
our dataset, as well as in this paper, is highly toxic, racist, and
hateful, and can be rather disturbing.
Relevance. We are confident that our dataset will be useful
to the research community in several ways. First, /pol/ con-
1http://boards.4chan.org/pol/
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Figure 1: Example of a typical /pol/ thread.
tains a large amount of hate speech and coded language that
can be leveraged to establish baseline comparisons, as well as
to train classifiers. Second, due to 4chan’s outsized influence
on other platforms, our dataset is also useful for understand-
ing flows of information across the greater Web. Third, our
dataset contains numerous events, including highly controver-
sial elections around the world (e.g., the 2016 US Presidential
Election, the 2017 French Presidential Election, and the Char-
lottesville Unite the Right Rally), thus the data can be useful
in retrospective analyses of these events.
Fourth, we are releasing this dataset also due to the relatively
high bar needed to build a data collection system for 4chan
and a desire to increase data accessibility in the community.
Recall that, given 4chan’s ephemerality, it is impossible to re-
trieve old threads. While there are other, third party archives
that maintain deleted 4chan threads, they are either no longer
maintained (e.g., chanarchive.org), are focused around front-
end uses (e.g., 4plebs), or are not fully publicly available (e.g.,
4archive.org).
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. First, we provide a high-level explanation on how
4chan works in Section 2. Then, we describe our data col-
lection infrastructure (Section 3) and present the structure of
our dataset in Section 4. Next, we provide a statistical anal-
ysis of the dataset (Section 5), followed by a topic detection,
entity recognition, and toxicity assessment of the posts in Sec-
tion 6. Finally, after reviewing related work (Section 7), the
paper concludes with Section 8.
2 What is 4chan?
4chan.org is an imageboard launched on October 2003 by
Christopher Poole, a then-15-year-old student. An OP can cre-
ate a new thread by posting an image and a message to a board.
Then, others can post on the OP’s thread with a message and/or
an image. Users can also “reply” to other posts in a thread by
referring to the post ID in their comment. Figure 1 shows a
typical /pol/ thread: (0) shows the original post, while (1), (2),
and (3) are other posts on that thread.
Boards. As of January 2020, 4chan features 70 different
boards, which are categorized into 7 high level categories,
namely, Japanese Culture, Video Games, Interests, Creative,
Other, Misc (NSFW), and Adult (NSFW). This paper presents
a dataset of posts on /pol/, the “Politically Incorrect” board,
which falls under the Misc category.
Anonymity. Users do not need an account to post on 4chan.
When posting, users have the option to enter a name along with
their post, but anonymous posting is the default and by far pre-
ferred way of posting on 4chan (see ‘a’ in Figure 1). Note that
anonymity in 4chan is meant to be towards other users and not
towards the service, as 4chan maintains IP logs and actually
makes them available in response to subpoenas [36]. Users
also have the option to use Tripcodes, i.e., adding a password
along with a name while posting: the hash of the password
will be the unique tripcode of the user, thus making their posts
identifiable across threads. In addition, some boards, including
/pol/, attach a poster ID to each post (d in the figure); this is a
unique ID linking posts by the same user in the same thread.
Flags. Posts on /pol/ also include the flag of the country the
user posted from, based on IP geo-location. Obviously, geo-
location may be manipulated using VPNs and proxies, how-
ever, popular VPNs as well as Tor are blacklisted [38]. Note
that /pol/ is only one of four boards using flags. Figure 1 also
shows the use of flags on /pol/: the author of post (2) appears
to be posting from the US (f).
In addition, users on /pol/ can choose troll flags when post-
ing, rather than the default geo-localization based country. As
of January 2020 the troll flags options are Anarcho-Capitalist,
Anarchist, Black Nationalist, Confederate, Communist, Cat-
alonia, Democrat, European, Fascist, Gadsden, Gay, Jihadi,
Kekistani, Muslim, National Bolshevik, Nazi, Hippie, Pirate,
Republican, Templar, Tree Hugger, United Nations, and White
Supremacist. For instance, the OP (post (0)) selected the “Eu-
ropean” troll flag (b).
Ephemerality. Ephemerality is one of the key features of
4chan. Each board has a limited number of active threads
called the catalog. When a user posts to a thread, that thread
will be bumped to the top of the catalog.
When a new thread is created, the thread at the bottom of
the catalog, i.e., the one with the least recent post, is removed.
After the thread is removed from the catalog it is placed into
an archive, and then, after 7 days, it is permanently deleted.
That is, popular threads are kept alive by new posts, while less
popular threads die off as new threads are created.
However, threads are also limited in the number of times
they can be bumped. When a thread reaches the bump limit
(300 for /pol/), it can no longer be bumped, but does remain
active until it falls off the bottom of the catalog.
Replies. Figure 1 also illustrates the reply feature of 4chan. A
user can click on the post ID (c) to generate a post including
“»post ID” (see, e.g., e in post (1)).
Moderation. 4chan has very little moderation, especially on
/pol/. Users can volunteer to be moderators, aka “janitors.”
Janitors have the ability to delete posts and threads, and also
recommend users to be banned. These recommendations go to
4chan employees who are responsible for reviewing user ac-
tivity before applying a ban. Overall, /pol/ is considered a con-
tainment board, allowing generally distasteful content, even by
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2016 2017 2018 2019 Total
Threads 643,535 1,123,341 922,103 708,932 3,397,911
Posts 21,892,815 44,573,337 39,413,548 28,649,533 134,529,233
Table 1: Number of threads and posts in the dataset.
4chan standards, to be discussed without disturbing the opera-
tions of other boards [21].
Slang. Over the years, 4chan has been the de-facto incuba-
tor for a huge number of memes and behaviors that we now
consider central to mainstream Internet culture, including lol-
cats, Rickrolling, and rage comics [15]. It has also served as a
platform for activist movements (e.g., Anonymous) and broad
political ideologies like the Alt-Right. In particular, /pol/ dis-
course is strongly characterized by a rather “original” slang,
with popular words appearing in our dataset including expres-
sions like “Goy” (a somewhat derogatory term originally used
by Jews to denote non-Jews, used on 4chan primarily in ref-
erence to anti-Semitic conspiracy theories where Jews act as
“malevolent puppet-masters” [1]), “Kek” (which originated as
a variant of LOL and became the God of memes, via which
they influence reality), “anon” (abbreviated for anonymous,
describing another 4chan poster), etc.
3 Data Collection
We now discuss our methodology to collect the dataset re-
leased along with this paper.
We started crawling /pol/, in June 2016, using 4chan’s JSON
API.2 (This was done as part of our first academic study of
4chan [21].) Given 4chan’s ephemeral nature, we devised the
following methodology to ensure we obtained the full/final
contents of all threads. Every 5 minutes, we retrieve /pol/’s
thread catalog and compare the list of the currently active
threads to the ones obtained earlier. Once a thread is no longer
active, we obtain the full copy of that thread from 4chan’s
archive. For each post in a thread, the 4chan API returns,
among other things, the post’s number, its author, UNIX times-
tamp, and content of the post. We explain in detail our dataset
and what it contains in the next section. Note that while we do
not provide posted images, posts do include image metadata,
e.g., filename, dimensions (width and height), file size, and an
MD5 hash of the image.
Table 1 provides an overview of our dataset. Note that for,
about 6% of the threads, the crawler gets a 404 error: from a
manual inspection, it seems that this is due to “janitors” (i.e.,
volunteer moderators) removing threads for violating rules.
The data released with this paper, as well as the analysis pre-
sented in later sections, spans from June 29, 2016 to November
1, 2019. Alas, our dataset has some (minor) gaps due to failure
of our data collection infrastructure; specifically, we are miss-
ing 10, 4, and 8 days worth of posts during 2016 (October 15
and December 16–24), 2017 (January 10–12 and May 13), and
2019 (April 13 and July 21–27).
2https://github.com/4chan/4chan-API
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the JSON structure of the
threads in our dataset. (Some keys are omitted to ease presentation.)
Ethical considerations. 4chan posts are typically anonymous,
however, analysis of the activity generated by links on 4chan
to other services could be potentially used to de-anonymize
users. Overall, we followed standard ethical guidelines [32]
and made no attempt to de-anonymize users. Also note that
the collection and release of this data does not violate 4chan’s
API Terms of Service.
4 Data Structure
In this section, we present the structure of our dataset, available
from [44].
The dataset is released as a single newline-delimited JSON3
file (.ndjson), with each line consisting of a full thread.
More specifically, each line is a JSON object which con-
tains a list of posts from a single thread. Each post is a
JSON object containing all the key/values returned by the
4chan API, along with three additional ones (entities, per-
spectives, and extracted_poster_id); see below. Note that the
poster ID (d in Figure 1) is not always available from the
4chan API. As of this writing, the API does not return poster
IDs for archived threads, but at certain points of our collec-
tion period, it did. To ensure that our dataset includes the
poster ID our data collection infrastructure parses the HTML
catalog of the 4chan threads to capture it and store it with
the key extracted_poster_id: 95% of the posts have an ex-
tracted_poster_id.
In Figure 2, we report the JSON structure of a thread with
two posts: the original post and the second post, with index 0
3http://ndjson.org/
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and 1, respectively. Due to space limitations, we only list some
of the keys, i.e., the most relevant to the analysis presented in
the rest of the paper. The complete list of keys, along with
the type of values they hold and any related documentation, is
available at [44].
Keys/Values from the API. Each post includes the following
key/values:
– extracted_poster_id: the poster ID.
– com: the post text in HTML escaped format.
– no: the numeric (unique) post ID.
– time: UNIX timestamp of the post.
– now: human-readable format of the UNIX timestamp.
– name: the name of the poster (default to “Anonymous”).
– trip: a unique ID to the poster, a hash computed based on
the password provided by the user, if any.
– country_name: full name of the country the user posts from.
– country: country code in Alpha ISO-2 format.
– troll_country: the troll flag selected by the poster, if any.
– bumplimit (only in the original post): flag indicating
whether a thread reached the board’s bump limit.
– archived_on (only in the original post): UNIX timestamp of
the time the thread is archived.
– replies (only in the original post): the number of posts the
thread has, without counting the original post.
As mentioned, we do not crawl images, however, the 4chan
API returns some image metadata, e.g.;
– filename: image name as stored on poster’s device.
– tim: the time the image is uploaded as a UNIX timestamp.
– md5: the MD5 hash of the image. Note that the image can
be found, using the MD5 hash, in unofficial 4chan archives
like 4plebs.4
Named Entities. For each JSON object, we complement the
data with the list of the named entities we detect for each post,
using the spaCy (v2.2+) Python library [35]. For each entity,
we include a dictionary with four different characteristics of
the named entity, namely:
– entity_text: the name of the detected entity.
– entity_label: the type of the named entity.
– entity_start: character index in com in which the named en-
tity starts.
– entity_end: character index in com in which the named en-
tity ends.
Perspective Scores. We also add scores returned by the
Google’s Perspective API [30], and more specifically seven
scores in the [0, 1] interval:
– TOXICITY (v6)
– SEVERE_TOXICITY (v2)
– INFLAMMATORY (v2)
– PROFANITY (v2)
– INSULT (v2)
– OBSCENE (v2)
– SPAM (v1)
The process of augmenting every post in our dataset with the
named entities and the perspective scores took place between
4https://4plebs.org/
(a) Threads
(b) Posts
Figure 3: Number of threads and posts shared per day.
January 2–9, 2020.
FAIR Principles. The data released along with this paper
aligns with the FAIR guiding principles for scientific data.5
First, we make our data Findable by assigning a unique
and persistent digital object identifier (DOI): 10.5281/zen-
odo.3606810.6 Second, our dataset is Accessible as it can
be downloaded, for free, and is in the standard JSON format.
JSON is widely used for storing data and has an extensive and
detailed documentation for all of the computer programming
languages that support it, thus enabling our data to be Interop-
erable. Finally, our dataset comes with rich metadata that are
extensively documented and described in this paper, in [44],
and in the 4chan API documentation as well. The data is re-
leased in full and hence is Reusable.
5 General Characterization
In this section, we provide a general characterization of the
dataset that we release. Our dataset spans 3.5 years, and this
prompts the need to shed light on the temporal evolution of
/pol/. Moreover, we analyze the use of tripcodes, images, and
flags within the board, aiming to showcase some of the peculiar
features that characterize 4chan.
Posting Activity. We start by looking at how /pol/’s posts are
shared over time. Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) show the num-
ber of threads and posts created per day, respectively. On av-
erage, throughout our dataset, over 2.8K threads and 112.3K
posts are posted every day on the board. We observe a peak in
posting activity on November 5-13, 2016 (around the US Pres-
idential Election) with 390K posts just on November 8 (Elec-
tion Day), followed by another peak that lasts from January 20
(Donald Trump’s inauguration: 195K posts) until February 3,
2017. Notably, the highest number of posts between these two
5https://www.go-fair.org/fair-principles/
6https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3606810
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(a) Threads – Hour of the week (b) Posts – Hour of the week
(c) Threads – Hour of the day (d) Posts – Hour of the day
Figure 4: Temporal characteristics of threads/posts per hour of week
and day. (UTC time zone, week starts on Monday.)
weeks is observed on January 29 with 204K posts when Don-
ald Trump issued a 90-day travel ban for certain nationals [23].
Additional peaks can be observed close to other world events:
(1) on April 7, 2017 (184K posts) when Donald Trump ordered
missile strikes in Syria [27]; (2) on April 1, 2018 (225K posts),
possibly due to Donald Trump criticizing California’s Gover-
nor Jerry Brown’s decision to grant 56 pardons [37]; (3) on
November 6, 2018 (192K posts), when the US Midterm Elec-
tion took place; and (4) March 15, 2019 (189K posts), when 51
people died in a terrorist attack in a New Zealand mosque [20].
Overall, posting activity on /pol/ is strongly related to im-
portant events worldwide and is known to spread conspir-
acy theories after catastrophic events take place. Notably,
numerous mainstream news outlets point to 4chan as the
conspiracy theory originator; for instance, about the phrase
“cheese pizza” referring to a pedophilic code in Hilary Clin-
ton’s leaked emails [4], the “deep state” organization against
Donald Trump’s administration [41], or about the Notre Dame
fire [33]. Therefore, we are confident our dataset will be useful
for further research analyzing conversations on 4chan, as well
as activity within and spilling off the platform in response to
important events and breaking news.
Temporal Patterns. We also look for temporal patterns
throughout the day/week. In Figure 4, we report the percent-
age of threads and posts, as per hour of day as well as hour
of week. We do so comparing across the years, finding a very
similar behavior throughout. Overall, we observe that the ac-
tivity seems to peak during what appear to be the hours of the
day in Western countries and more or less weekdays.
Flags. We then look at the countries where posts originate, us-
ing the flags displayed on /pol/. Recall that these are based on
IP geo-localization so at best they provide a signal for gen-
eral trends and should not be taken at face value. In Fig-
ure 5, we report the top 10 countries, along with the num-
ber of threads (Figure 5(a)) and overall posts (Figure 5(b))
they created. The most active countries are the US (1.6M
threads and 68M posts), followed by the UK (200K threads and
(a) #threads created per flag (b) #posts per flag
(c) #threads created per troll flag (d) #posts per troll flag
Figure 5: Number of threads created and posts per flag and troll flag.
9.7M posts), Canada (210K threads and 8.1M posts), Australia
(121K threads and 5.1M posts), and Germany (83.3K threads
and 3.7M posts). We also report the top 15 “troll flags” with
“Nazi” being the most popular with over 50K threads (Fig-
ure 5(c)) and 1.2M posts (Figure 5(d)).
Figure 6(a) and 6(b), depict the choropleths of the number of
threads and posts created per country worldwide, respectively,
this time normalized using each country’s estimated Internet-
using population.7 While the US dominates in terms of sheer
volume of threads created (Figure 5(a)), when taking into ac-
count the number of Internet users, the top 5 countries ac-
tually are Canada (0.0066), Australia (0.0059), US (0.0058),
Ireland (0.0058), and Croatia (0.0054). As for posts, the top
5 countries are Monaco (0.35), Finland (0.26), Canada (0.25),
Australia (0.25), and Iceland (0.24). Overall, besides Croatia,
Monaco, and Finland, we find a number of North and East Eu-
ropean countries being relatively active.
Thread Engagement. Next, we look at how many posts
threads tend to get. On average, there are 39.6 posts per
thread throughout our dataset, with this number increasing
over the years, and specifically 34, 39.7, 42.7, and 40.4 for
2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, respectively. To capture the distribu-
tion of posts per threads we plot the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) and the Complementary Cumulative Distribu-
tion Function (CCDF) for each year in Figure 7. The figure
highlights that, overall, more /pol/ threads tend to get more
posts over time. Specifically, 37%, 41%, 43%, and 44% of the
threads in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively, have over
100 posts.
We also test for statistically significant differences between
the distributions, using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test, finding them on each pair (p < 0.01). Thus, this
suggests that the change over the year is indeed significant.
Tripcodes. Next, we study the use of tripcodes by /pol/ users
to see whether this is negligible or relatively widespread. Re-
7https://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/
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(a) threads
(b) posts
Figure 6: Choropleth of the number of threads created/posts per
country, normalized by Internet-using population.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: CDF and CCDF of the number of posts per thread.
call that tripcodes are the only way a user can “sign” their posts
on 4chan, letting others recognize posts made by the same user
across different threads. For instance, the QAnon far-right con-
spiracy theory (built around alleged efforts by the “deep state”
against US President Donald Trump) started with a post on
4chan in October 2017 by someone using the name Q [41]; Q
has reportedly used tripcodes on 4chan and 8chan to “authen-
ticate” themselves.
In Figure 8, we plot the CDF and the CCDF of the number
of posts with unique tripcode. Overall, we find that the use of
tripcodes goes down over the years.
– 2016: 311K posts (0.23%) with unique tripcode from 5.7K
different posters;
– 2017: 365.6K posts (0.27%) from 7.1K posters;
– 2018: 206K posts (0.15%) from 3.6K posters;
– 2019: 117K posts (0.09%) from 2.3K posters.
Images. Sharing images is very common on 4chan, in fact,
OPs need to post an image when creating new threads. Specif-
ically, 4chan is mentioned by popular press and academic stud-
ies about the amount of original content (e.g., memes) it creates
and disseminates across the Web [29, 42, 22]. We aim to pro-
vide an overview of how many image metadata are included in
(a) (b)
Figure 8: CDF and CCDF of the number of posts with unique trip-
code.
(a) (b)
Figure 9: CDF and CCDF of the number of images per thread.
our dataset. To shed light on the use of images on /pol/ over the
years, we plot the CDF and CCDF of the number of images per
thread in Figure 9. We find that around 27% of posts (36.9M)
in our dataset include an image. On average, 9.2, 10.8, 11.9,
and 11 images appear, per thread, in 2016, 2017, 2018, and
2019, respectively.
Overall, 2017 was the year with the highest number of im-
ages shared: 12.1M. Specifically, 17% of the threads in 2016
have over 10 images, rising to 19% in 2017, and eventually
around 20% in 2018 and 2019. We test for statistically signif-
icant differences between the distributions using a two-sample
KS test, and find them on each pair (p < 0.01).
6 Content Analysis
In this section, we provide an analysis of the content of the
posts in our dataset. More specifically, we detect the most pop-
ular topics discussed over the years, the named entities men-
tioned in each post, and how toxic a post is.
While the latter two are included in our data release, the
first is not because topic extraction is done over sets of posts.
Nonetheless, we present it here to give an overview of what is
discussed on /pol/, and thus is in the dataset.
6.1 Topics
Looking at topics frequently mentioned on /pol/ over the years
provides a high-level reflection of the nature of discussions
taking place on the board. Importantly, researchers interested
in studying discussions around specific topics included in this
analysis can find our dataset useful.
We use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), which is used for
basic topic modeling [9]. First, for each year, we collect the
escaped HTML text provided for each post by the 4chan API.
Then, before tokenizing every post, we remove any stopwords,
6
Topic Year 2016
1 people (0.007), like (0.005), think (0.005), right (0.004), thing (0.004), know (0.004), polite (0.004), need (0.003), want (0.003), human (0.003)
2 Trump (0.03), vote (0.021), elect (0.013), leaf (0.012), president (0.012), Hillary (0.011), fuck (0.01), shit (0.01), lose (0.009), happen (0.009)
3 white (0.023), bump (0.013), nigger (0.013), country (0.009), praise (0.009), black (0.009), check (0.008), race (0.008), fuck (0.008), people (0.007)
4 thread (0.022), Jew (0.014), fuck (0.014), faggot (0.014), good (0.011), kike (0.010), wrong (0.009), kill (0.009), shill (0.009), retard (0.009)
5 fuck (0.009), girl (0.009), women (0.009), like (0.008), dick (0.007), cuck (0.007), love (0.006), look (0.006), woman (0.006), lmao (0.006)
Topic Year 2017
1 post (0.021), shit (0.012), know (0.011), fuck (0.01), think (0.009), meme (0.009), retard (0.009), fake (0.008), mean (0.007), leaf (0.007)
2 good (0.009), moor (0.008), lmao (0.006), base (0.006), go (0.006), kill (0.005), movie (0.004), fuck (0.004), like (0.004), roll (0.004)
3 people (0.006), like (0.005), think (0.004), thing (0.004), work (0.003), want (0.003), know (0.003), right (0.003), social (0.003), human (0.003)
4 nigger (0.012), fuck (0.007), money (0.006), like (0.006), people (0.006), year (0.005), work (0.005), want (0.005), live (0.005), shoot (0.005)
5 thank (0.027), anon (0.021), kike (0.012), love (0.01), remind (0.008), fuck (0.008), maga (0.007), delete (0.007), sorry (0.007), time (0.007)
Topic Year 2018
1 bump (0.025), good (0.018), thank (0.017), anon (0.015), happen (0.01), Christmas (0.009), suck (0.007), dick (0.006), feel (0.006), hope (0.006)
2 white (0.016), Jew (0.01), country (0.009), American (0.006), German (0.006), fuck (0.006), people (0.006), America (0.006), Europe (0.006), European (0.006)
3 kike (0.024), right (0.014), fuck (0.012), mean (0.011), Israel (0.011), wall (0.01), btfo (0.01), boomer (0.009), go (0.008), haha (0.007)
4 money (0.007), work (0.007), year (0.006), people (0.006), live (0.005), like (0.004), fuck (0.004), need (0.004), go (0.004), want (0.004)
5 fuck (0.027), post (0.02), thread (0.019), faggot (0.013), shit (0.012), retard (0.01), know (0.01), shill (0.009), flag (0.009), meme (0.008)
Topic Year 2019
1 people (0.006), christian (0.006), believe (0.005), Jew (0.005), like (0.005), think (0.005), Jewish (0.004), know (0.004), read (0.004), white (0.004)
2 white (0.015), country (0.009), Jew (0.009), America (0.007), American (0.007), china (0.006), people (0.006), Israel (0.006), fuck (0.006), Europe (0.005)
3 fpbp (0.007), sage (0.007), drink (0.007), glow (0.006), nigga (0.006), like (0.005), fuck (0.005), tulsi (0.005), water (0.005), meat (0.005)
4 base (0.089), bump (0.05), post (0.022), true (0.016), incel (0.015), cringe (0.014), redpill (0.014), know (0.012), seethe (0.011), btfo (0.01)
5 kike (0.025), flag (0.024), nice (0.022), leaf (0.015), shill (0.015), meme (0.013), fuck (0.013), cope (0.011), memeflag (0.009), forget (0.008)
Table 2: Topics discussed on /pol/ per year.
URLs, and HTML code. Last, we create a term frequency-
inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) array that is used to fit
our LDA model. TF-IDF statistically measures how impor-
tant a word is to a collection of words; previous work shows it
yields more accurate topics [26].
In Table 2, we list the top five topics discussed on /pol/ for
each year, along with the weights of each word for that topic.
We find that, during 2016, /pol/ users were discussing political
matters in a significant manner, and in particular the 2016 US
Presidential Elections (topic 2). We also find several topics
with racist connotations, like kike (derogatory term to denote
Jews) and nigger. Other racist topics appear in other years as
well, which highlights that controversial and racist words are
used frequently on /pol/.
Overall, our topic analysis shows that discussions in /pol/
feature political matters, hate, misogyny, and racism over the
course of our dataset.
6.2 Toxicity
Next, we set to score the content of the posts according
to how toxic, inflammatory, profane, insulting, obscene, or
spammy the text is. To this end, we use Google’s Perspec-
tive API [30], which offers several models for scoring text
trained over crowdsourced annotations. We choose Google’s
Perspective API as other available methods mostly use short
texts (tweets) for their training samples [14]. Perspective API
should perform better for our dataset as it was trained using
comments with no restriction in character length [5], similar to
the comments of our dataset.
We focus on the following 7 models:
– TOXICITY and SEVERE_TOXICITY: quantify how rude or
disrespectful a comment is; note that the latter is less sen-
sitive to messages that include positive uses of curse words
compared to the former.
– INFLAMMATORY: how likely it is for a message to “inflame”
discussion.
– PROFANITY: how likely a message is to contain swear or
curse words.
– INSULT: how likely a message is to contain insulting or neg-
ative content towards an individual or group of individuals.
– OBSCENE: how likely a message is to contain obscene lan-
guage.
– SPAM: how likely a message is to be spam.
We score each post in our dataset using the API and include the
results in the final dataset. We only obtain results for posts that
include text, since scores are computed only over text. That is,
we do not score 2.3% (3.1M) of the posts in our dataset that
have no text.
In Figure 10, we plot the CDF of the scores for each of the
models. We observe that /pol/ exhibits a high degree of toxic
content: 37% and 27% of the posts have, respectively, TOXIC-
ITY and SEVERE_TOXICITY scores greater than 0.5 (see Fig-
ure 10(a)). These results are in line with previous research
findings [21]. For the other models, we observe similar trends:
36% of the posts have an INFLAMMATORY score greater than
0.5 (Figure 10(b)), 33% for PROFANITY (Figure 10(b)), 35%
for INSULT (Figure 10(b)), 30% for OBSCENE (Figure 10(b)),
but only 16% for SPAM (Figure 10(c)). We also test for statis-
tically significant differences between the distributions in Fig-
ure 10, using two-sample KS test, and find them on each pair
(p < 0.01).
Overall, we are confident that this additional set of labels
can be extremely useful for researchers studying hate speech,
bullying, and aggression on the Web.
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Figure 10: CDF of the Perspective Scores related to how toxic, inflammatory, obscene, profane, insulting, or spammy is a post.
Named Entity #Posts (%) Entity Label #Posts (%)
Trump 2,461,452 1.83 DATE 92,945,374 69.06
one 1,811,983 1.35 CARDINAL 20,069,995 14.92
first 1,584,686 1.18 PERSON 17,532,857 13.03
US 1,066,408 0.79 ORG 17,145,386 12.74
Jews 963,398 0.72 NORP 16,820,469 12.50
America 831,007 0.62 GPE 14,813,739 11.01
Europe 719,873 0.54 TIME 4,498,824 3.34
two 703,767 0.52 ORDINAL 2,923,765 2.17
American 676,332 0.50 LOC 2,676,504 1.99
Israel 589,718 0.44 PERCENT 2,189,227 1.68
Table 3: Top 10 named entity and entity label that appear in /pol/
posts.
6.3 Named Entity Recognition
Finally, we extract the “named entities” mentioned in /pol/
posts, as we hope this will allow the research community
to study discussions around specific entities, e.g., individu-
als, countries, etc. To obtain the named entities, we use the
en_core_web_lg model publicly available via the SpaCy li-
brary [35]. We choose this specific model over other alter-
natives since it was trained with the largest available dataset.
In addition, previous work [31] ranked it among the top two
most accurate methods for named entity recognition. It uses
millions of Web entries consisting of news articles, blogs, and
comments to detect and extract a variety of entities from text.
Entities range from specific popular individuals to nationali-
ties, countries, and even events.8
We run the entity detection model against all the posts in our
dataset and include the extracted entities in the final dataset.
Note that the model did not return any entities for 18M posts
(13%); this is expected since a lot of posts do not reference any
entities and due to the fact that a considerable number of posts
do not have any text.
In Table 3, we list the ten most popular named entities in our
dataset. Note that a post can mention a popular entity more
than once. We report the number of posts in our dataset that
mention an entity at least once. We find that Donald Trump
is the most popular named entity on /pol/ with over 2.46M
posts (1.83%) mentioning him. Other popular named entities
include “US” (0.79%), “Jews” (0.72%), “America” (0.62%),
“Europe” (0.54%), “American” (0.50%), and “Israel” (0.44%).
We also report the top ten entity labels in our dataset. The
entity labels specify the category of the entity mentioned in
each post (e.g., “PERSON” for Donald Trump). The most
8See https://spacy.io/api/annotation#named-entities for the full list of labels.
popular label is date (69.06%), followed by cardinal numbers
(14.92%), and real or imaginary people (13.03%). Other pop-
ular labels include organizations (12.74%), nationalities, reli-
gious, or political groups (12.50%), and times smaller than a
day (3.34%). Reviewing the most popular named entities and
labels of our dataset suggests that discussions on /pol/ are re-
lated to discussions about world happenings and events.
Overall, we hope that augmenting our dataset with the
named entities will be valuable to researchers working on
Computational Social Sciences who wish to study discussions
around specific individuals, nationalities, etc.
7 Related Work
In this section, we review relevant related work. Over the past
couple of years, a number of research papers have used data
collected from 4chan; some also mention that data is available
upon request. Overall, our 4chan dataset is, to the best of our
knowledge, 1) the only one to be freely and publicly available
online, and 2) the largest and most comprehensive one, includ-
ing 3.5 years worth of data.
Studies focusing on 4chan. Bernstein et al. [8] crawl 5.5M
posts from 500K threads posted on the “Random” (/b/) board
between July 19 and August 2, 2010, and present a content
analysis showing how posts are dominated by images and post-
ing of external URLs. Their dataset is not openly accessible.
Hine et al. [21] collect 11M posts from June 30 to September
12, 2016 from 3 different boards, namely, “Politically Incor-
rect” (/pol/), “Sports” (/sp/), and “International” (/int/), pre-
senting a general characterization of the former while mostly
using the latter two for comparison. Overall, they study the
effect of ephemerality and bump limits, and show that /pol/
is characterized by a high degree of hate speech. Moreover,
they find that the board serves as an aggregation point for co-
ordinated harassment campaigns on other platforms such as
YouTube. Given the timeline of the data (Summer 2016), a lot
of the content is related to the 2016 US Presidential Election,
with 4chan users exhibiting unconventional support, often in
terms of memes and novel image content, to Donald Trump’s
2016 presidential campaign. The dataset of this study is only
available upon request and, more importantly, only includes
2.5 months rather than 3.5 years worth of data.
Tuters and Hagen [39] analyze 1M posts from 4chan’s /pol/
that contained words enclosed in triple parenthesis, i.e., ((())).
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They find that such posts often feature anti-Semitic nature and
that /pol/ posters tend to create and use political and racist
memes. This dataset is not openly accessible.
Finally, Pettis [7] collect 2.7K and 1.1K threads from /pol/
and the “Technology” board (/g/), respectively and focus on
qualitatively studying whether anonymity lets individuals be
more open to reveal their emotions and beliefs online. Again,
this dataset is not available online.
Multi-platform studies. Zannettou et al. [43] study how
mainstream and fringe Web communities (4chan, Reddit, and
Twitter) share mainstream and alternative news sources to in-
fluence each other. Between June 30, 2016 and February 28,
2017 they collected: a) 487K tweets; b) 42M posts, 390M
comments, and 300K subreddits; and c) 97K posts made on
/pol/, /sp/, /int/, and the “Science” board (/sci/). They find that,
before a story is made popular, it was often posted on 4chan for
the first time, and use a statistical method called Hawkes Pro-
cess to quantify the influence of 4chan with respect to news
dissemination. This dataset is available upon request. Snyder
et al. [34] collect more than 1.45M posts from paste-bin.com,
282K posts from /pol/ and /b/, and 4K posts from 8ch’s /pol/
and /baphomet/ to detect doxing. This dataset is not publicly
available. Then, Zannettou et al. [42] present a large-scale
measurement study of the meme ecosystem, using 160M im-
ages obtained from /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab. They col-
lect 74M unique images from Twitter, 30M from Reddit, 193K
from Gab, and 3.6M from /pol/. The study shows that Reddit
and Twitter tend to post memes for “fun,” while Gab and /pol/
users post racist and political memes targeting specific audi-
ences. Importantly, they find that /pol/ is the leading creator
of racist and political memes, and the subreddit "The_Donald"
is very successful in disseminating memes to both fringe and
mainstream Web communities. The authors created an openly
accessible dataset, however, it only consists of the URLs and
the hashes of the images collected. Finally, Mittos et al. [28]
gather 1.9M threads from /pol/, along with the pictures posted,
and 2B comments from 473K subreddits. They extract posts
that might be related to genetic testing, showing the context
in which genetic testing is discussed and finding that it often
yields high user engagement. In addition, the discussion of
this topic often includes hateful, racist, and misogynistic com-
ments. Specifically, /pol/ conversations about genetic testing
involves several alt-right personalities, antisemitism, and hate-
ful memes. The authors did not make their dataset openly ac-
cessible.
Dataset Papers. Here we list other dataset papers that are also
somewhat related to the motivations behind our work, in that
they release data associated with social network content as well
as potentially nefarious activities. Brena et al. [10] present a
data collection pipeline and a dataset with news articles along
with their associated sharing activity on Twitter, which is rele-
vant in studying the involvement of Twitter users in news dis-
semination. The pipeline can also be used to classify the politi-
cal party supported by Twitter users, based on the news outlets
they share along with the hashtags they post on their tweets.
Fair and Wesslen [17] present a dataset of 37M posts, 24.5M
comments, and 819K user profiles collected from the social
network Gab, which, like 4chan, is often associated to alt-right
and hateful content. Their dataset includes user account data,
along with friends and follower information, and edited posts
and comments in case a user made an edit.
Garimella and Tyson [19] present a methodology for col-
lecting large-scale data from WhatsApp public groups and re-
lease an anonymized version of the collected data. They scrape
data from 200 public groups and obtain 454K messages from
45K users. They analyze the topics discussed, as well as the
frequency and topics of the messages to characterize the com-
munication patterns in WhatsApp groups. Finally, Founta et
al. [18] use crowdsourcing to label a dataset of 80K tweets
as normal, spam, abusive, or hateful. More specifically, they
release the tweet IDs (not the actual tweet) along with the ma-
jority label received from the crowdworkers.
8 Conclusion
This paper presented our 4chan dataset; to the best of our
knowledge, the largest publicly available dataset of its kind.
The dataset includes over 3.3M threads and 134.5M posts from
4chan’s Politically Incorrect board collected between June
2016 and November 2019. We also augmented the dataset with
a set of labels measuring the toxicity of each post, as well as
the named entities mentioned in each post.
Overall, we are confident that our work will further motivate
and assist researchers in studying and understanding 4chan as
well as its role on the greater Web. Access to the dataset could
also help answer numerous questions about /pol/, e.g., what is
the nature of discussion on the board following sharing of news
articles? what is the role played by 4chan in alternative and
fake news dissemination? what is 4chan’s role in coordinated
aggression campaigns, doxing, trolling, etc.? Moreover, using
this dataset in conjunction with data from other social networks
could also help researchers understand the similarities and dif-
ferences of users of different communities. Also, our dataset
is an invaluable resource for training algorithms in natural lan-
guage processing, modeling of slang words, or detecting hate
speech, fake news dissemination, conspiracy theories, etc. Fi-
nally, we hope that the data can be used in qualitative work to
present in-depth case studies of specific narratives, events, or
social theories.
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